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PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POLITICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
Private property plays two opposing roles in stories about the
environment. In the story favored by most environmentalists, private
property is the bad guy.' It balkanizes an interconnected ecosystem
into artificial units of individual ownership. Owners of these finite
parcels have little incentive to invest in ecosystem resources and
every incentive to dump polluting wastes onto other parcels. Only by
relocating control over natural resources in some central authority like
the federal government, can we make integrated decisions designed to
preserve the health of the entire ecosystem. For these traditional
environmentalists, private property is the problem; public control is
the solution.
There is a counter story, told by the proponents of what is
sometimes called free market environmentalism. 2 In this story, private
property is the good guy. Environmental degradation is a problem
because of incomplete property rights. If all resources were privately
owned, then no one would be able to impose externalities on anyone
else; potential polluters would have to purchase the right to pollute
first. Similarly, if all resources-including habitats of endangered
species and other ecologically sensitive resources-were privately
owned, then owners would have incentives to invest in the
preservation of these resources, and would use their ingenuity to get
persons who care about environmental protection to pay for it. For
free market environmentalists, public control of resources is the
problem; private property is the solution.
Both sides in this debate are only half right. The traditional
environmentalists are closer to the mark in their diagnosis of the
problem. Property rights are always and inevitably incomplete, as it is
costly to set up and enforce any system of private property. Because
* Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269,
1275-77, 1284-85 (1993).
2. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).
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property rights are incomplete, owners of resources that are subject to
private ownership-such as parcels of land devoted to productive
uses-will always have incentives to disregard the costs they impose
on common resources that are not subject to private ownership.
Sometimes creating new types of property rights can help the
situation; more often, however, the only cost-effective solution to
these sorts of spillovers is government regulation.
On the other hand, the free market environmentalists are closer to
the mark in devising a solution to the problem. Missing from the
traditional account is any credible theory of how we can generate
collective action to protect sensitive ecosystem resources. Bursts of
collective altruism do happen, but they are difficult to sustain.
Witness the history of socialism, or, more pertinently the history of
environmentalism. 3 What is needed is an institutional arrangement
that generates private incentives supporting collective action that will
protect the environment. The best such arrangement is the widespread
private ownership of land. In this sense, the free market
environmentalists are closer to the mark in their prescription of a cure
than are the traditional environmentalists, with their call for a bigger
government.
I.
Casual empiricism strongly suggests that private property is good
for the environment. Eastern Europe in the 1980s offered a kind of
natural experiment about the effects of different property regimes.4
An iron curtain ran through Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the
Mediterranean. West of the line, real property was predominately
subject to private ownership. East of the line, real property was
owned by the state. The results were plain for all to see: while towns
and villages on the west side were typically neat and clean, with well-
scrubbed streets and colorful boxes of flowers in the windows, towns
and villages on the east side were drab and dirty, with plaster falling
off the walls and no flowers to be seen anywhere. These paired
communities were generally composed of buildings of the same
vintage and style of construction and were populated by families
3. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004)
(describing the gridlock that has descended upon environmental law in an era of divided
government).
4. See Jon Thompson, East Europe's Dark Dawn, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, June 1991, at
42-44, 52, for a discussion of environmental conditions in Eastern Europe after the fall of
communism.
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having the same ethnic background and cultural traditions. The only
difference was that for forty years the communities in the west had
been under a regime of private property, while those in the east had
been under a regime of collective ownership.
Clearly, there is some kind of relationship between private property
and environmental amenities. But what exactly is the causal
mechanism that leads from private property to increased
environmental protection?
Undoubtedly, part of the explanation has to do with what might be
called the private law incentives created by a system of private
property. As Harold Demsetz pointed out many years ago, private
property is a powerful mechanism for internalizing externalities
through private law.5 Private property does this in two ways. First,
private property allows one unique owner to capture improvements in
the quality of the resources that are privately owned. If there were no
private property in resources, any improvements would be
experienced mostly as external benefits by others, and hence
improvements would be under-produced. Second, by designating one
person as the owner of resources, private property makes contracting
about the use of resources easier-including contracting to reduce
externalities. If these resources could not be privately owned,
contracting about their use would be incredibly complicated and
would almost never take place.
Without denigrating the importance of these private law forces, I
would stress something else: that widespread ownership of private
property transforms public law as well as private law. It does so
through the creation of what might be called the private property
lobby. This immensely powerful lobby creates a political culture that
favors the regulation of uses of private property that diminish the
value of other private property.
The public law impact of private property may be more significant
than the private law effect, in terms of generating significant
protection for the environment. To see this, consider three effects of
private property stressed by the body of literature that followed
Demsetz and his thesis about the private law effects of private
property.6 I will call these the "wealth effect," the "capitalization
effect," and the "accountability effect." In each case, the impact of
these effects is weak or ambiguous insofar as it is manifested through
5. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS
& PROC. 347, 347-50 (1967).
6. Id.
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private law incentives and market mechanisms. In contrast, insofar as
each effect is translated into public law, it has a powerful effect on the
environment.
A. The Wealth Effect
First, consider the "wealth effect." Private property generates
wealth.7 One reason for this is that private property creates vastly
enhanced incentives for investing in improvements to resources.
Another reason is that private property translates into longer time
horizons in considering investments. A third is that private property
leads to a much more efficient allocation of resources. In any event,
for a given stock of natural resources, a system in which those
resources are subject to private ownership and control will generate
more wealth than a system in which such resources are controlled by
the government or subject to open access.8
Just as private property generates more wealth, additional wealth
generates more environmental protections. The relationship is not
strictly linear. Data gathered by various economists suggest that
increased wealth in society is initially associated with a decline in
environmental quality. 9 As gross national product (GNP) per capita
continues to grow, however, the relationship quickly turns around and
further increases in wealth become associated with increased levels of
environmental protection activity. Gene Grossman and Alan Kruger,
two Princeton economists, have estimated that pollution as a
percentage of GNP increases with economic growth until GNP
reaches about $5,000 per person;' 0 from then on, pollution as a
percentage of GNP steadily declines as the economy continues to
grow." Thus, after the initial hump is passed, a continuously higher
percentage of social resources is dedicated to environmental
protection.
Why does more wealth mean more environmental protection?
Private incentives may account for some of the phenomenon. As
people get richer, they devote more resources to cleaning up their own
7. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 50-57 (2000); Cass R.
Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 911-913 (1993).
8. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1325-28, 1335-41
(1993), for comparative data on the productivity of privately versus collectively-owned
land.
9. See GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH 317-33 (1995); BJORN
LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST 33 (2001).
10. EASTERBROOK, supra note 9, at 331.
11. Id.
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property, either because they do not like living amidst smoke and
grime or out of a sense of pride. It is also possible that as people get
richer, they enter into more explicit and implicit contracts-Coasean
bargains 12 -with neighbors in order to curb polluting activities. But
the wealth effect also creates incentives for private behavior less
favorable to the environment. As people get richer, waste streams
grow larger. If the only constraints on individuals are pride and
private contractual obligations, many will be tempted to dispose of
these wastes onto their neighbors' land. Considering only private
incentives and market mechanisms, the net effect of rising wealth on
the environment is uncertain.
But rising wealth has another effect: stimulating higher demand for
environmental protection through political mechanisms. As people get
richer, they develop a stronger taste for environmental amenities.'
3
This taste translates into a demand for government action to protect
the environment. Additional wealth also makes achievement of this
regulatory protection more feasible. As they get richer, people
become more willing to have a portion of their wealth taxed to
support the regulatory and enforcement efforts necessary to sustain a
program of public environmental protection. Thus, the strong
correlation economists have uncovered between rising wealth and
declining pollution is due, in large part, to increased regulatory
activity in wealthy countries.
B. The Capitalization Effect
A second mechanism linking private property and the environment
is the "capitalization effect." Property does not exist in splendid
isolation from that which surrounds it. Instead, the value of property
is profoundly affected by its environs. 4 A small bungalow in a gritty
industrial district may be worth only a few thousand dollars; the same
bungalow with a beautiful view of the ocean may be worth a million
or more. An economist would say that the ugliness or beauty of the
surroundings is capitalized into the market value of the property. All
things being equal, a clean, pleasing environment with numerous
12. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4-5, 9 (1960)
(discussing the possibility of contracts between property owners to optimize nuisance-like
spillovers).
13. See Nemat Shafik, Economic Development and Environmental Quality: An
Econometric Analysis, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 757 (1994), for some evidence of this
phenomenon.
14. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102
MICH. L. REv. 1, 20-23 (2003).
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recreational opportunities makes property values go up. A dirty,
dangerous environment without any parks or other greenery makes
property values go down.
The capitalization effect, like the wealth effect, creates incentives
for both private and political action. It undoubtedly creates private
incentives for owners to improve their own properties, which provides
external benefits to their neighbors. It also creates incentives to join
with other neighbors in mutual efforts to enhance the quality of the
neighborhood. This can take a number of forms, from volunteering to
pick up litter in the park to entering into formal covenants to assure
that property is not used in ways that might cause a decline in
property values. Nevertheless, there are limits to how far the
capitalization effect can drive these sorts of efforts. Each property
owner has an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others who
participate in the litter patrol or enter into burdensome covenants.
Thus, the impact of the capitalization effect on private efforts to
enhance the environment is likely to be weak.
However, the capitalization effect also creates an incentive for
property owners to become involved in the political process.
Professor Bill Fischel of Dartmouth calls this the "Homevoter
Effect.' 15 Homeowners are the most potent political force in the
community, Fischel argues, and they use their power to pressure
politicians to adopt policies-including pro-environmental ones-that
will increase property values. Fischel believes that homevoter power
can be seen most clearly in local politics, as homevoters lobby to keep
out unwanted land uses like dumping, and demand that developers of
new subdivisions create new parks. State and national environmental
protection laws provide another method for voters to preserve or
increase property values through legislation. For example, cleaning up
Lake Michigan enhances property values along the Chicago lakefront,
making such laws attractive to homeowners in that region; stricter air
pollution laws enhance the value of property in Los Angeles and
would appeal to wealthy Angelinos.
C. The Accountability Effect
A third effect that private property has on the environment can be
called the "accountability effect." When resources are owned by the
government or held in open access commons, no single person is the
15. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES (2001).
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resident manager of any particular group of resources; thus, no one
can be held accountable for an environmental mess. Under a private
property regime things are very different. Because each patch of
resources has its own owner, and hence we know whom to blame
when bad things start emanating from any particular area.
The accountability effect undoubtedly provides a small but positive
boost to private efforts to enhance environmental quality. Because of
the accountability effect, shaming can play a role in achieving a
degree of environmental protection. Members of the community will
generally know who is a good neighbor, environmentally speaking,
and who is not. Those who are not good neighbors can be criticized or
ostracized, and this may cause them to adjust their behavior.16 The
accountability effect also creates the precondition for Coasean
bargains among neighbors that are designed to internalize
externalities. There is no way to enter into a contract to limit
environmental harms until people know with whom they should
contract. Parcelization through private property provides this
information. Again, however, there are limits as to how much
environmental protection we can achieve through social norms and
Coasean bargains. Undoubtedly, we can make some progress toward
environmental protection efforts, and it is even very likely that we can
accomplish more than most people would expect. However, free rider
problems will limit how far these strategies can go.
The accountability effect also has a powerful impact on political
action to protect the environment. If resources are owned by the
government or are held in common, then it is possible to have
collective action designed to protect these resources. Such protection
takes the form of directives from upper level bureaucrats to lower
level bureaucrats. There is a lot of room for slippage in such cases, a
situation which is known as the principal-agent problem. Lower level
bureaucrats may be more interested in pursuing their own agendas
than in faithfully executing the orders from above. 17 Once we
introduce private property, however, regulation takes on much more
bite. Because there is an accountable owner of each parcel, we can
readily determine who is responsible if pollution or other
environmental harms emanate from any particular parcel. The owner
can be easily pinpointed and subjected them to civil or criminal
16. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 184-85, 230-36 (1991).
17. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 36-37 (1971).
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sanctions, which could include losing ownership of the property.
In short, because of the wealth, capitalization, and accountability
effects, a system of private property provides a modest boost to
private law efforts to enhance environmental quality. Additionally,
these three effects exert an even more powerful force on the political
system in the direction of greater environmental enforcement activity.
Il.
The foregoing thesis has important implications for a number of
important policy questions. For example, it suggests that public
ownership of natural resources may lead to the inevitable degradation
of these resources. This in turn suggests that the strong presumption
against further private disposition of the public domain lands-which
constitute about thirty percent of the land mass in the United States-
may be misguided from an environmental protection perspective.
Moreover, this thesis suggests that local regulation may be a more
powerful force for environmental protection than either state or
federal regulation. Thus, the strong presumption in favor of increased
centralized control over resources may be misguided from an
environmental protection standpoint. Let me turn to two other policy
implications, which I will consider in somewhat greater detail.
A. Constitutional Shield for Private Property?
The first of these implications concerns the perennial debate over
how far constitutional protections for private property should shield
owners from the effects of environmental regulation. We can consider
two extreme policies here, neither of which would be very
satisfactory in terms of their impact on the environment.
One extreme policy would be to eliminate all constitutional
protection for private property. This would greatly increase the risks
of investing in private property, as the government could seize private
property at any time without paying just compensation. In such a
world, which has existed in many times and places, economic activity
would grind to a halt. The expected return on investments in property
and the level of investment would decrease and significant resources
would be diverted to concealing assets or lobbying the government to
take someone else's property rather than one's own, further
depressing economic activity. The wealth effect associated with
private property would be reduced, as would the capitalization effect.
Because the government could seize property without paying for it, it
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is plausible that the percentage of assets owned by the government
would increase, reducing the accountability effect. In all likelihood,
the policy of denying all constitutional protections for private
property would be harmful to the environment.
Now consider the opposite policy, one that would provide full
indemnity to property owners for losses in value attributable to
environmental regulations. Superficially considered, this would have
the opposite effect. Private property would face no risks from adverse
government action, thereby increasing the wealth, capitalization, and
accountability effects. It might therefore increase the return on private
and voluntary efforts to improve the environment. But by making the
government- and taxpayers-pay for all losses in value associated
with environmental regulations, the full compensation policy would
greatly reduce the return on political action seeking to protect the
environment. This would almost certainly have a dampening effect on
environmental cleanup efforts.
To see how this might happen, consider the following numerical
example focusing on the capitalization effect. 18 Suppose a brickyard
that emits smoke and odors operates in a residential neighborhood.
The pollution depresses the value of adjacent land by $1.5 million,
and causes $750,000 in additional injuries to more remote property
and persons who work in or pass through the neighborhood. Suppose
further that the loss in value to the brickyard if it is shut down is $1
million. Finally, suppose that the cost to adjacent landowners of
organizing a political campaign to enact an ordinance that would
close the brickyard is $500,000. If no compensation is required for
closing the brickyard, then the surrounding landowners will invest
$500,000 in securing the ordinance, and will reap a profit of $1
million in the form of increased land values. This will generate a net
surplus of benefits over costs in the amount of $750,000.
In contrast, suppose that the brickyard is entitled to full
compensation in the amount of $1 million, and that the adjacent
landowners are charged a special assessment to pay this
compensation. On these assumptions, the adjacent landowners will
have no incentive to lobby for a shutdown of the brickyard. Such a
law will result in no change in the capitalized value of their property
- the property owners' net gain from eliminating the smoke nuisance
will be eliminated by the new tax assessments. Anticipating this, the
18. I have adopted the example from Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404-07
(1915), a classic takings case.
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landowners will forgo any political action to shut down the brickyard.
This will result in inefficient under-regulation, because the other
affected owners, workers, and passersby will have to continue to
suffer from the pollution.'
9
The point of this example is not to argue that environmental
regulation is economically justified or unjustified-the numbers could
be manipulated to reach either result. Rather, the point is that
requiring full indemnification for all losses in value caused by
environmental regulations would result in a reduction in political
activity to secure such regulations, provided there is any overlap at all
between the beneficiaries of the regulation and the persons who must
pay for the compensation. Since there is reason to believe that
political action is critical in securing environmental protection, this
result would be harmful to the environment.
In short, a rule of no compensation for government takings would
be harmful to the environment because this would depress wealth and
property values, thereby reducing incentives to engage in collective
action to enhance environmental protection efforts. A rule of full
indemnification for all losses associated with environmental
protection regulations would also be harmful to the environment,
because it would reduce the returns on collective environmental
protection efforts. This suggests that the optimal compensation rule is
one that strikes a balance between no compensation and full
compensation. This, of course, is our current system. Property owners
are compensated for government expropriations of their land, but not,
except in extreme circumstances, for reductions in land value
resulting from government regulations. 20
B. Equality in Distribution of Environmental Benefits?
The second policy implication of this thesis concerns
environmental justice or, more pungently, environmental racism. 2 1
The focus here is on the distribution of environmental benefits (such
as parks) and harms (such as pollution and landfills). Studies have
indicated that the poor suffer from a surfeit of environmental harms
19. I assume that because of transaction costs, there is no possibility of collective action
by these diffuse beneficiaries.
20. The principal exception is for regulations that eliminate the value of the land. See
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19 (1992).
21. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1009-15 (1993);
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 796-811 (1993).
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and a deficit of environmental benefits.22 Researchers have also made
disturbing findings that, adjusting for income, communities with large
numbers of racial minorities are disproportionately exposed to
environmental harms.23 One might argue that this reflects some
deeply embedded institutional racism in the environmental regulatory
process.
The thesis proposed here-that property ownership is a critical
ingredient in producing political support for environmental
regulation-suggests an alternative explanation. Historically there has
been a significant gap in home ownership between white and
nonwhite families, a gap which persists to this day.24 If members of
minority groups are less likely to own real property at any given level
of income than whites, one would expect to find lower levels of
political activism in minority communities in support of aggressive
environmental regulation. This reduced level of political activism
would translate into a disproportionately high level of environmental
harms and disproportionately low level of benefits in minority
communities.
The thesis also suggests the direction in which a solution to this
disparity might lie. The only permanent solution to the imbalanced
distribution of environmental harms and benefits across different
communities is to equalize the level of political clout across
communities. This is true without regard to the level of government at
which the distribution of harms and benefits is determined. If harms
and benefits are distributed at the national level, it is important that
those in the community opposed to the harms (and in favor of the
benefits) have access to federal executive officials, legislative
oversight committees, and courts for judicial review. On the other
hand, if harms and benefits are distributed locally, it is important that
the community have access to the mayor, city council, zoning board,
and state courts for judicial review. This type of sustained political
pressure is most likely to come from persons whose property values
are most significantly affected by the presence of environmental
harms and benefits in the community. This suggests that the long-term
solution to problems of environmental justice is to increase the
incidence of property ownership within minority communities.
22. See Lazarus, supra note 21, at 792-93.
23. See Lazarus, supra note 21.
24. See, e.g., William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, Race and Home Ownership:
1900-1990, at http://www.eh.net/Clio/Conferences/ASSA/Jan_00/margo.shtml (last
visited Nov. 16, 2004).
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III. CONCLUSION
Private property creates wealth, capitalizes environmental costs and
benefits into property values, and makes owners accountable for the
environmental harms they cause. As such, private property creates the
conditions for its effective regulation. Karl Marx might say that this is
evidence of the cultural contradictions of private property; it is not.
There is no contradiction-only the need for a delicate balance. While
private property must be sufficiently free of government regulation
and taxation in order to represent a major share of household wealth,
it cannot be overprotected to the point that government regulation is
thwarted. Exactly where to strike the balance will always be
controversial. The fact that some kind of balance is necessary in order
to achieve effective environmental protection should not be.
